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Abstract
Social policies rely on specific expectations vis-a-vis their beneficiaries, who have to abide by certain eligibility criteria or
behavioral standards to access the benefits or services provided. As such, they draw boundaries between the deserving
and undeserving, which results in the following paradox: While social policies claim to be universal, they actually exclude
potential beneficiaries by imposing on them the compliancewith these eligibility criteria and behavioral standards. In other
words, purportedly universal social policies may have exclusionary effects, in the form either of selectivity (street-level bu-
reaucrats select what they perceive as legitimate beneficiaries) or of self-exclusion and non-take-up (people entitled do
not claim benefits or services). Based on the case of the Swiss disability insurance, this article explores the extent of, and
the reasons underlying, the paradoxes of universalism within active social policies. It relies on a mixed-methods research
design, combining sequence analysis (showing the selectivity of active reforms regarding people’s access to disability ben-
efits) and in-depth interviews. The conclusion of this article suggests that not all forms of universalism are equally exposed
to such paradoxes and proposes a hypothesis to be explored in further research: The more requiring and precise in terms
of eligibility criteria and behavioral standards social policies and activation strategies are (hard universalism), the higher
the risk that they lead to selective practices in contradiction with their universal ambition. By contrast, fuzzier eligibility or
behavioral criteria (soft universalism), which allow for adjustment to individual circumstances, may lead tomore genuinely
universal and inclusive social policies.
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1. Introduction: What is at Stake with Universalism?
Literature has abundantly shown that most social poli-
cies are characterised by a tension between universalism
and selectivity. Rothstein considers them as ideal-types:
On the one hand, universalism is characterized by a high
degree of universal coverage, “i.e., benefits and services
are intended to cover the entire population through-
out the different stages of life, and on the basis of uni-
form rules…without the application of economic needs-
testing (or means-testing)” (Rothstein, 1998, pp. 19–20);
on the other hand, selectivity refers to social policies
that do not cover the entire citizenry, applying needs or
means testing and delivering benefits according to what
Rothstein calls “discretionary allocation,” with a view to
focusing on the “truly needy” (Rothstein, 1998). Esping-
Andersen’smodels ofwelfare (1990) showhowcountries
combine both principles of universalismand selectivity in
different ways. While the liberal model heavily relies on
selectivity, i.e., on targeting and means-testing benefits,
the social-democratic model, which characterises mainly
Scandinavian welfare states, insists on the relevance of
a universalistic approach providing generous cash ben-
efits or in-kind services to all citizens or inhabitants of
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 168–177 168
a country. Universalistic approaches have been put un-
der pressure in the contemporary context, even among
the countries pertaining to the social-democratic model
(about such processes of “de-universalisation” see Goul
Andersen, 2012; van Kersbergen & Kraft, 2017). This re-
sults in a higher concern for containing social expendi-
ture, generally coupled with the development of activa-
tion programmes conceived as the best solution to pro-
mote welfare recipients’ return to the labourmarket and
to reduce the caseload. It is then claimed that univer-
salistic benefits tend to generate inactivity and poverty
traps resulting in long-term exclusion or dependency on
welfare. By contrast, selectivity is presented as a more
efficient way to use public money as only those who re-
ally need benefits receive them, and in such a way that
incentivises them to re-integrate the labour market and
regain financial autonomy. This increased focus on tar-
geting and selectivity is however not meant as the end
of universalism in social policies, but rather as a new
way to envisage the issue of universalism, which com-
bines elements of selectivity or targeting with renewed
conceptions of universalism based on notions such as
“targeting within universalism” (Skocpol, 1991), “quasi-
universalism” (Leisering, 2009), “conditional universal-
ism” (Ferrera, 1998), etc. In this article, we want to ex-
amine these new configurations and their inclusionary
or exclusionary effects in the field of disability policies.
We will show what impact such configurations have
on the access to disability policies (be it cash bene-
fits or in-kind services). We aim at analysing whether,
how, and why “conditional universalism” based on ac-
tivation requirements produces paradoxical impacts on
beneficiaries. Indeed, activation policies rely on specific
expectations vis-a-vis their beneficiaries, who have to
abide by certain eligibility criteria or behavioural stan-
dards to access the benefits or services provided. As
a result, purportedly universal social policies may have
exclusionary effects. Our research shows that, in prac-
tice, not all eligible people are benefitting from such ac-
tivation measures, either because of selectivity—street-
level bureaucrats select those they perceive as legiti-
mate beneficiaries—or of self-exclusion and non-take-
up—people entitled do not claim benefits or services
(Rosenstein, 2018). It is precisely this paradox, of a pro-
gramme designed to encompass all recipients and prac-
tically excluding some of them, that will be the centre of
our attention.
This article explores the extent of, and the reasons
underlying, this paradox resulting from a universalistic
approach to activation and its selective implementation.
Our focus is not on the fundamental gap between po-
litical discourses and their actual implementation that
may result in forms of selectivity—this has been abun-
dantly documented since Michael Lipsky’s (1980) semi-
nal work on the discretionary power of street-level bu-
reaucrats. Rather, our ambition is to understand why ef-
forts to enlarge access to active programmes and make
activation a universal path for welfare recipients, result
in forms of selectivity that exclude many of them from
activation tracks. To address this issue, we investigate
the case of the Swiss disability insurance (DI), which has
recently undergone a series of active reforms with a
view to extending access to activation programmes and
support disabled people in entering or returning to the
labour market.
Our analyses rely on a mixed-methods research de-
sign. Section 2 provides an overview of the policy con-
text of Swiss disability policies and its recent evolution.
Section 3 presents the data andmethods used. Section 4
is articulated in three subsections: Section 4.1 presents
the overall impact of activation on DI claimants’ tra-
jectories, revealing the tensions between purposed uni-
versalism and actual selectivity; Section 4.2 focuses on
the impact of age on access to disability benefits; and
Section 4.3 highlights inequalities according to the type
of impairment. Section 5 concludes and draws recom-
mendations for closing or rather shortening the gap be-
tween discourses of universalism and practices of selec-
tivity. It suggests that the capability approach may well
represent the foundation for amore respectful and effec-
tive universalism.
2. DI and its Active Reforms: A Brief Contextualisation
DI (Assurance-invalidité in French, or Invalidenversiche-
rung in German) is a central institution of the Swiss wel-
fare system. Its mission is twofold: On the one hand, to
prevent, reduce, or eliminate disability, this is the rehabil-
itation or activation part; on the other hand, to compen-
sate citizens’ loss of income resulting from disability, this
is the financial compensation part. To do so, DI provides
two kinds of benefits that are mutually exclusive: voca-
tional rehabilitation measures (accompanied by daily al-
lowances) and long-term disability pensions (that can be
full or partial pensions, depending on claimants’ loss of
income). Since the creation of DI in 1960, its motto has
always been “Rehabilitation before pension,” i.e., pen-
sions aremeant to be a last resort solution for those peo-
ple who cannot be rehabilitated. However, the number
of pension recipients steadily increased over the years
(OFAS, 2018), especially since the early nineties (+89%
between 1990 and 2005), thus confronting the DI to ma-
jor financial difficulties. To face this situation and reduce
the number of pensions, a series of legal reforms were
designed that had deep-seated consequences on DI im-
plementation at the local level. Inspired by the principles
of activation and following theOECD (2003, 2006) recom-
mendations, the Federal Law on DI was amended three
times in a row, over a very short period (in 2004, 2008,
and 2012) with a view to increasing the outflow. The cor-
nerstone of this active turn of DI was undoubtedly its
5th revision.
Implemented in 2008, the aim of the 5th revision
of DI was to reduce by 20% the number of new pen-
sions granted every year. To reach this goal, the premise
was to invest massively in vocational rehabilitation pro-
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grammes in order to make them more accessible and ef-
ficient. This implied a four-fold activation strategy. First,
accelerate the procedures and introduce early detection
and intervention programmes in order to preserve recip-
ients’ working capacity and optimise their chances to re-
turn (or remain) on the labour market. Second, develop
the catalogue of vocational rehabilitation programmes
to make it more congruent with disabled people’s needs,
including job placement programmes. Third, hire about
300 additional case managers to follow DI beneficiaries
at the local level. And, fourth, reinforce recipients’ in-
dividual responsibility, including their duty to collabo-
rate and commit themselves actively in rehabilitation
measures. This implied the adoption of a new sanction
regime, also accompanied by new tools to fight against
fraud. All these evolutions pointed to the ambition of
effectively implementing universalistic activation to all
people with a residual working capacity that could be
used on the competitive labour market. These reforms
were thus faithful to the initial motto “Rehabilitation be-
fore pension,” claiming to fully implement it in the actual
DI practices. It is precisely the effectiveness of this claim
that we investigate in this article, trying to identify suc-
cesses and failures and the reasons underlying them.
3. Data and Methods
The study on which this article is based mobilised a
mixed-methods research design, including:
1. A documentary analysis (based on legal docu-
ments, public reports, and statistics);
2. Semi-directed interviewswith DI local actors (man-
agers, case managers, doctors, psychologists, etc;
N = 22);
3. In-depth biographical interviews with people who
claimed for DI benefits (N = 23);
4. Sequence analysis (N = 1500), applied to a sample
of people who applied to the Office of DI in the
canton of Vaud (the biggest DI office in the French-
speaking part of Switzerland).
The complementarity of these methods and the triangu-
lation of data have been conceived as follows: First, we
carried out the documentary analysis in order to under-
stand the legal context in which DI operates, and to iden-
tify themajor social and economic issues faced byDI over
the last decades. This first step allowed us to grasp the
meaning of DI reforms, the aims, and the means of acti-
vation in this specific welfare context. Second, we com-
pleted the sequence analyses, in order to measure the
longitudinal impact of active reforms on the administra-
tive trajectory of three cohorts of DI claimants. On this
basis, we identified specific trends that guided our ques-
tioning through qualitative interviews. Third, we pro-
ceeded to semi-directed interviews with DI local actors
in order to grasp the way they interpret and implement
DI reforms. Finally, we sampled DI claimants belonging to
the three cohorts analysed statistically in order to com-
plete in-depth biographical interviews. The samplingwas
based on the results of the sequence analyses, identify-
ing three groups according to their administrative trajec-
tories: people who were entitled to a vocational reha-
bilitation measure (the activated group), people who re-
ceived a DI pension (the so-called “passive” group) and
people who were considered as not eligible to DI bene-
fits (the refusal group). In order to carry out in-depth bio-
graphical interviewswith a variety of people belonging to
each of these three groups, the sampling was made tak-
ing into account three variables: age, gender, and type of
impairment of respondents.
This article relies mainly on the quantitative analy-
ses, complemented by some references to the documen-
tary analysis and the qualitative interviews; therefore,
we present our quantitative methodology in some more
detail. We used sequence analysis to provide a longitudi-
nal view on the effect of DI reforms on claimants’ trajec-
tories. To do so, we used administrative data provided by
the local disability office of the canton of Vaud. These in-
clude socio-demographic data such as year of birth, sex,
health impairment, together with information about the
administrative trajectory of beneficiaries (for instance
whether and when their application was accepted, what
type of benefits they received, etc.). We created three
representative sub-samples of 500 individuals, randomly
selected according to the year of their first application for
DI benefits (respectively in 2000, 2004, and 2008). These
years were chosen in order to capture the impact of acti-
vation reforms presented above. Then, we reconstructed
their administrative trajectory over the 48 months fol-
lowing their application. In the figures presented below,
the horizontal axis corresponds to the time passing by,
with t + 0 designating the month of application. The ver-
tical axis indicates the relative part of each state compos-
ing our alphabet, i.e., each administrative state that DI
claimants may have encountered after their application.
This includes states within DI schemes (like the period of
assessment of their application or the granting of DI ben-
efits) but also states designating the way they left DI (for
instance, after a job placement or a refusal of their claim
for benefits). The administrative data includes a highmul-
tiplicity of such states, we thus coded them into 10 cate-
gories. To highlight the effects of activation on claimants’
trajectories, this article focuses on the comparison of the
cohorts who claimed for benefits in 2000 (before DI ac-
tive reforms) and 2008 (after active reforms).
We attributed a specific colour to each of the 10
states thatmay occur along the claimants’ administrative
trajectory (see legend of Figures 1, 2, and 3). Assessment
(in red) corresponds to the administrative state during
which claimants’ eligibility to DI benefits is examined,
both in legal and medical terms. Partial pension (in or-
ange) and full pension (in yellow) show the proportion of
claimants who are granted a DI pension, generally on the
long-term. So-called “helplessness allowances” (in dark
green) are granted to pensioners who need specific care
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services due to the severity of their disability. Vocational
rehabilitation (in light green) includes all training pro-
grammes funded by DI in order to improve beneficiaries’
earning capacity. This includes mainly certified training
programmes. Placement (in blue-grey) gathers the job
placement programmes introduced by DI active reforms.
Refusal (in light blue) designates the part of claimants as-
sessed as not eligible for benefits. Temporary exit (in dark
blue-grey) is an uncommon state, referring to the situa-
tion of people who temporary left the DI, after a short-
term vocational rehabilitation measure and before a sec-
ond application. Unlike temporary exit, permanent exit
(in dark blue) corresponds to the case when beneficia-
ries definitely left the DI after the end of a vocational re-
habilitation programme. This state also includes the very
limited number of cases of people who exited the DI af-
ter their pension was suppressed. Retirement (in mauve)
entails the situation of people who left DI because they
entered the retirement pension scheme. Finally, death
(in purple) shows the part of claimants whose follow-up
by DI was suppressed because they passed away.
4. Results
4.1. Activation between Universalistic Discourses and
Selective Practices
The first paradox we identified relates to the gap be-
tween the formal ambition of activating every benefi-
ciary with a remaining earning capacity, as it appears
in political discourses and policy designs (including legal
texts and institutional documents), and its actual imple-
mentation and translation into welfare claimants’ trajec-
tories. The question at stake here is to establish a pre-
cise diagnosis about the extent to which activation pro-
grammes are inclusive or exclusive and activation can be
considered as a universal and inclusive path.
When the main active reform of DI was introduced
in 2008, the objective was to improve the access to voca-
tional rehabilitation programmes in order to increase the
outflow. This implies that, for each personwho claims for
DI benefits, the opportunity of a vocational rehabilitation
must be thoroughly examined before considering his or
her eligibility to a pension. As proclaimed by the Swiss
Federal Council in its message supporting DI 5th revision:
In the future, it will be more difficult to access pen-
sions for insured people with health difficulties that
impact their earning capacity. They will be entitled to
a DI pension if and only if their earning capacity, in
all likelihood, cannot be restored, maintained, or im-
proved through rehabilitationmeasures that could be
reasonably required. Besides, specific attention will
be paid to what activities can still be, from an objec-
tive viewpoint, reasonably required from them, de-
spite their health difficulties….Such strengthening of
the conditions for the granting of pensions is com-
pensated by the reinforcement of rehabilitation pro-
grammes. (Swiss Federal Council, 2005, p. 4287, au-
thors’ translation)
Besides, the duty of claimants to collaborate and commit
themselves actively in rehabilitation measures has been
strongly emphasised:
In the future, insured people will play a leading role
in their own rehabilitation. By collaborating actively
with the DI and by complying with their duty to coop-
erate, they will show that they truly aim at their re-
insertion in active life with the support of competent
people and that they take their responsibilities accord-
ingly. They thus also fulfil their obligation to reduce
the damage or harm that caused their disability, thus
doing a great service to themselves and society.When
insured people do not display the expected commit-
ment and do not fulfil their duty to collaborate, they
will henceforth be sanctioned more quickly and more
directly, in the form of a benefit reduction or refusal.
(Swiss Federal Council, 2005, pp. 4281–4282, authors’
translation)
Thus, the willingness to push DI beneficiaries into acti-
vation is very clearly stated, insisting that activation is
the only practicable path for people who have a resid-
ual working capacity. As summarised by an interviewed
DI employee: “It is like a noose around claimants, to
whom we say, ‘You have the choice between being reha-
bilitated and being rehabilitated.”’ In short, it is claimed
that there is no way out of activation, which is con-
ceived as a panacea for all beneficiaries with a residual
working capacity. For street-level bureaucrats too, acti-
vation through vocational rehabilitation programmes is
presented as themost appropriate solution, which ought
to be tried whenever there seems to be an even limited
chance for success. Granting activation programmes is
highly valued by the tools and indicators used to mon-
itor their activity; conversely, if activation fails, this is
not sanctioned, i.e., if activated people get a disabil-
ity pension in the end because rehabilitation attempts
proved to be ineffective, this is not considered as a
bad performance.
However, if we look at Figure 1, comparing the ad-
ministrative trajectories of people who claim for disabil-
ity benefits before (2000) and after (2008) the DI active
turn, vocational rehabilitation measures (in light green)
are far from being a universal and inclusive path. Indeed,
if we compare the proportion of people involved in a re-
habilitation programme one year after they applied for
DI benefits, we see that they represented 3% of the 2000
sample, against 8% of the 2008 sample. This shows that,
even if the access to rehabilitation is higher for the most
recent cohort, it remains highly selective, in spite of the
introduction of early intervention tools and the acceler-
ation of DI assessment procedures (in red). Taking as an
indicator the situation at t + 12 (one year after they ap-
plied for DI benefits), we see that 75% of the 2000 sam-
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Figure 1. Comparison of two cohorts of DI claimants (2000 and 2008). Source: Rosenstein (2018; computed on the basis
of administrative data provided by the DI Office of the canton of Vaud).
ple were still waiting for DI decision, against 35% among
the 2008 cohort. The speed at which files are processed
has been considerably increased but this does not, as yet,
result in a much higher proportion of activated people.
Moreover, our sequence analyses show that active re-
forms result in a decrease in the number of pensions de-
livered by DI. If we compare the situation at t + 48, we
see that while almost one person out of two (49%) used
to benefit from aDI pension four years after their applica-
tion in 2000 (be it a partial pension—in orange, or a full
pension—in yellow), only 28% of the 2008 cohort was
granted a pension. This massive reduction in the num-
ber of pensions delivered by DI does not coincide with
an equivalent increase of the number of activated peo-
ple. Rather, it is explained by the rise in the number of
refusals (in light blue), i.e., the people who were consid-
ered as not eligible to DI benefits. Four years after their
application, 19% of the 2000 cohort left DI after a refusal,
while 28% of the 2008 cohort were in the same situation.
Thus, paradoxically, the objective of universal activation,
i.e., of including all people with a residual working capac-
ity into rehabilitation programmes, resulted in excluding
themaltogether fromDI benefitsmore than in increasing
the rate of activation within DI.
This first set of analyses provides a good illustration
of the paradox of activation and its claim to universalism.
While vocational rehabilitation is officially presented as
the only path for all peoplewith a residualworking capac-
ity (we could even speak of a universal duty to activate in
their case), our results show that it remains highly selec-
tive. Only a few people seem to fulfil the requirements
to enter and complete a vocational rehabilitation pro-
gramme. This questions the effective accessibility of re-
habilitation programmes for disabled peoplewith a resid-
ual earning capacity. Indeed, we observe a clear gap be-
tween the political will to enlarge access to activation
and its actual and limited implementation, in spite of a
clear speed up in file processing. However, it should be
mentioned that this very limited increase in the access
to vocational rehabilitation programmes may in part re-
sult from the fact that the analysis focuses on the cohort
of 2008, i.e., the very year when the 5th revision was
adopted.We could indeed formulate the hypothesis that
the full implementation of active reformsmay takemore
time and thus the impactmay bemore significant among
more recent cohorts.
Our results also show a disconnection between the
limited rise in the number of people involved in voca-
tional rehabilitation and the significant reduction in the
number of pensions delivered. This seems to invalidate
the assumption underlying the DI reforms that there is
a causal effect between investing in vocational rehabil-
itation programmes and reducing the number of pen-
sions delivered. Rather, it appears that activation reforms
have been more effective in reducing the access to so-
called “passive” measures than in promoting an active
support to DI claimants. All in all, this tends to suggest
that the conception of universalistic activation underly-
ing the Swiss DI reforms has a twofold exclusionary ef-
fect: It proves largely unable to include people into re-
habilitation tracks, while it is much more efficient in ex-
cluding disabled people from DI benefits in general. This
conclusion does not equally apply to all categories of re-
cipients, however. It thus needs to be contrasted along
the age and the type of impairment of DI claimants.
4.2. Age as a Factor of Exclusion
As illustrated in Figure 2, we observe important in-
equalities between youngsters and other generations in
terms of accessing vocational rehabilitation programmes.
Indeed, in both the 2000 and the 2008 cohorts, the
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Figure 2. Comparison of two cohorts of DI claimants, according to age. Source: Rosenstein (2018; computed on the basis
of administrative data provided by the DI Office of the canton of Vaud).
vast majority of vocational rehabilitation programmes
(in light green) were granted to people belonging to the
18–34 age group. If we compare the situation at t + 12
(one year after the application), in the 2000 cohort (up-
per half of Figure 2), 9% of the 18–34 year old were in-
volved in active measures, against less than 2% among
the 35–49 year old and none of the 50–65 year old. In
the 2008 cohort, the access to vocational rehabilitation
programmes progressed, but still in an uneven way: At
t+ 12, 17% of the youngsters followed a vocational reha-
bilitation programme, against 9% among the middle age
group, and less than 2% among the seniors. Thus, access
to active programmes varies along the recipients’ age,
which confirms that activation is not a universal path,
rather it tends to follow unequal patterns according to
age categories.
Besides, our results reveal another limitation of DI
reforms. While these were particularly aimed to tackle
the increasing number of young pensioners, our analy-
ses show that their rate has not decreased. The share
of 18–35-year-old receiving pensions (full and partial) re-
mained the same for both cohorts (33%, 4 years after
their application). By contrast, for the 35–49 and 50–65
age groups, the impact has been very tangible and is re-
flected in a marked increase in benefit refusals (+79%
among 35–49-year old, and +54% among 50–65-year
old). Unlike the situation of young people, access to pen-
sions for the older age groups has been significantly re-
duced, without any proportional progress in their access
to vocational rehabilitation measures. For example, 9%
of the 35–49-year-old belonging to the 2008 cohort were
involved in active measures one year after their applica-
tion (against less than 2% among the cohort of 2000).
These inequalities ought to be interpreted in rela-
tion to the selectivity operated by the labour market it-
self, especially regarding middle aged and senior work-
ers. Interviewswith both DI local agents and DI claimants
underline the obstacles faced by middle and old age dis-
abled people when they are looking for a job. As this re-
cipient puts it:
Even the counsellor of the unemployment insurance
toldme thatwithmy age andmy health issues, I won’t
find a job. So what am I supposed to do? I am too
young to be retired and too old to find a job.
Taking into account the selectivity of the labour market,
DI local agents themselves operate their own selection
among beneficiaries. As this DI employee confirms:
Maybe we devote less energy to certain beneficiaries.
Of course, we have a certain deontology and we have
to treat everyone in the same way. But we must also
deliver results, so we have to focus on people who
have the potential to succeed.We devote a littlemore
energy on these cases, also because they will have
more solutions within their reach.
This example illustrates what Merton (1968) calls
“Matthew effects,” i.e., a reinforcement of the advan-
tages and resources provided to the most favoured in-
dividuals or groups, while the situation of the most vul-
nerable ones gets worse. In the present case, Matthew
effects may lead to the exclusion of middle or old-age
claimants from active tracks. This takes place especially
when activation is conceived as a social investment that
needs to deliver high returns (Bonoli, Cantillon, & van
Lancker, 2017). This points out a second paradox or limi-
tation of a universalistic approach to activation. By focus-
ing on the necessity to adapt claimants to employers’ re-
quirements, activation produces forms of selectivity that
tend to reproduce patterns of inequalities on the labour
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market, supporting the ones that appear asmore “includ-
able” or “adaptable” and excluding the others from acti-
vation tracks.
4.3. Health Impairments and the Limits of Universalism
Important differences can be observed between the
trajectories of people according to their health status.
Figure 3 compares the trajectory of people who applied
for DI benefits in 2000 and 2008, according to the type of
impairment they were confronted to. We grouped them
in three categories: people with a physical impairment;
people with a psychical impairment—this category in-
cludes all cases cumulating both physical and psychical
impairments; and people for whom DI agents concluded
that therewas no impairment. It should benoted that our
definition of psychical impairment relies on the official
classification of impairments used by DI (including psy-
choses, neuroses, and personality disorders). This classi-
fication is based on a medical approach to impairment
that does not coincide with the biopsychosocial model
used, for example, by theWorldHealthOrganization in its
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and
Health. The proportion of people with a psychical impair-
ment among DI pension recipients increased significantly
during last decades, becoming the leading cause of dis-
ability in Switzerland. As such, it has been specifically tar-
geted by DI and its recent reforms.
Within the cohort of 2000 (upper half of Figure 3),
vocational rehabilitation measures (in light green) were
mainly allocated to people with a physical limitation (7%
of themwere involved in a rehabilitation programme two
years after their application, against less than 2% among
people with a psychical impairment). But the 2008 co-
hort reveals that the balance has changedwith the imple-
mentation of the DI active reforms. Among this cohort,
people with a psychical impairment benefitted more of-
ten of vocational rehabilitation programmes than people
with a physical disability. Thus, one year after their appli-
cation, 16% of people with a psychical impairment were
involved in an active programme, against 9% among
people suffering from a physical limitation. This change
mainly results from the introduction in 2008 of specific
rehabilitation measures devoted to people with psychi-
cal impairments, which were conceived as a solution to
curb their increasing number among people receiving a
disability pension.
What is even more revealing is to compare the three
categories against the proportion of people exiting from
disability schemes. Indeed, when looking at the propor-
tion of people leaving the DI after a job placement mea-
sure (in blue-grey) or in case of a definitive exit (in dark
blue) in 2008, we see that they aremore frequent among
people with a physical impairment than among people
with a psychical impairment. For example, four years af-
ter their application in 2008, 15% of the people with
a physical condition were involved in a job placement
programme, against 9% among people with a psychical
impairment. Such programmes are the closest to the
labour market and the rate of participation into these
programmes can thus be used as a yardstick to assess
the efficiency of activation programmes. Hence, these re-
sults show that activation measures are significantly less
efficient to promote the inclusion of people with a psy-
chical impairment on the labour market. This seems to
suggest that, even with a considerable investment and
commitment of DI and of its recipients towards activa-
tion, the probability of exiting DI schemes and returning
to the labourmarket remains unequal and less accessible
to people with a psychical impairment.
This points to a third paradox of universalistic ap-
proaches to activation, i.e., that activation is not the
Figure 3. Comparison of two cohorts of DI claimants, according to the type of impairment. Source: Rosenstein (2018; com-
puted on the basis of administrative data provided by the DI Office of the canton of Vaud).
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panacea to promote inclusion. On the contrary, our re-
sults show that activation by itself does not constitute
an appropriate or sufficient remedy to promote inclu-
sion for all. The case of people with psychical impair-
ments illustrates this paradox. For them, there is a risk
that the obstacles they face in vocational rehabilitation
or job placement programmes that are not appropriate
or tailor-made enough regarding their specific needs, are
interpreted as signals of their incapacity to be included
in the labour market. In such cases, people with psy-
chical impairments are left with no other forms of sup-
port than pensions. This is precisely what happened to
this beneficiary:
I found a job, but I broke down. I resisted for about
a month and then, one morning, I collapsed. I got up
to a point where I did not sleep anymore. So I said to
the DI counsellor ‘Listen, I cannot make it.’ It was a
fixed-term employment, partly subsidised by DI, but
it was full-time and I broke down….I had everything
in my hands to succeed. In addition, with a good
salary. I asked the director to lower my activity rate
to 50% but she said to me, ‘I cannot, I need someone
100%.’ So immediately after that, I asked for a 50%
DI pension.
This example illustrates how the notion of universalism
purported by the reformed DI may paradoxically result
in polarising welfare trajectories of inclusion/exclusion.
This is confirmed by Figure 3, revealing a differential ac-
cess to disability pensions according to the type of im-
pairment. In both the 2000 and the 2008 cohorts, access
to pension is uneven, but the evolution of the situation
provides interesting insights. Indeed, while in the 2000
cohort, 47% people with a physical limitation were re-
ceiving a disability pension four years after their appli-
cation, they were only 27% in the same situation in the
2008 cohort. In the same way, 72% among people with
a psychical impairment were receiving a disability pen-
sion four years after their application in the 2000 cohort,
against 59% in the 2008 cohort. We thus observe a re-
duction in the proportion of pension recipients for both
categories on the one hand, and awidening gap between
the two categories on the other hand. This shows the dif-
ferential ability of the reformed DI to activate recipients:
while people with physical problems could be activated
to a significant extent (thus reducing the caseload from
47% to 27%), such was not the case for people with a psy-
chical impairment (from 72% to 59%), showing a lower
capacity to provide inclusion through activation for this
latter category.
Finally, Figure 3 also reveals a considerable decrease
in the proportion of people with psychical impairment
from 2000 to 2008 (N = 126 or 25% of the overall 2008
sample, compared to N = 186 or 37% of the 2000 sam-
ple). At the same time, we see that the proportion of
individuals for whom DI employees concluded that they
had no impairment (third column of Figure 3) increased
from16%of the 2000 sample (N= 78) to 25%of the 2008
sample (N = 126). This suggests that the introduction of
a universalistic approach to activation in 2008 paradoxi-
cally resulted in an increase of the number of refusals to
grant DI benefits and services, i.e., in a higher selectivity
towards DI claimants. This is due, to a large extent, to the
tightening of eligibility criteria discussed in the previous
sections. Furthermore, we see that this selectivity does
not operate randomly, but concerns much more signifi-
cantly people with a psychical impairment, as is shown
by the considerable decrease of their proportion in the
2008 cohort. Thus, rather than promoting inclusion for
all, activation exacerbates inequalities at the expense of
people with psychical impairments. As a matter of fact,
it appears that the active turn of DI polarised the prob-
ability to access DI benefits and services or to exit the
DI track on the long run, according to the type of impair-
ment. This in turn confirms that activation is not a univer-
sal path.
5. Conclusion
Throughout this article, we tried to understand how and
why purportedly universal social policies may have exclu-
sionary effects. Based on a mixed-methods research de-
sign, applied to the case of the Swiss DI, we identified
three paradoxical effects of a universalistic approach to
activation on the inclusion/exclusion of vulnerable peo-
ple. The first paradox relates to the gap between the of-
ficial ambition to promote activation as a universal path
for all people with a residual earning capacity, as it ap-
pears in political discourses and policy designs, and its ac-
tual implementation at the local level. Our analyses have
shown that even if the access to activation programmes
has slightly improved, they are by no means universally
accessible insofar as only a few claimants seem to ful-
fil the requirements of activation. Besides, our results
also pointed out that the active turn of DI resulted in
a massive reduction of the access to pensions. As such,
the universalistic approach to activation, rather than pro-
moting inclusion by broadening the access to vocational
rehabilitation programmes, seems to be more success-
ful in denying access to so-called passive measures such
as disability pensions. The second paradox points to the
fact that despite its universal ambition, individuals are
not on an equal footing in front of activation. Our analy-
ses have shown for instance that vocational rehabilita-
tion programmes are barely accessible for people over
35 years old. These inequalities have to be interpreted
in relation to the selectivity of the labour market that
makes peoplemore or less likely to be employed, notably
according to their age. The risk is thus that DI local agents
exclude the least employable beneficiaries from activa-
tion programmes in order to focus on those who seem
to demonstrate the highest probability to be included
on the labour market. As such, universalistic approaches
to activation are subjected to Matthew effects. Finally,
the third paradox concerns the fact that universalistic ap-
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proaches to activation do not seem to be equally success-
ful for all beneficiaries. Comparing the trajectories of DI
claimants according to their health status displays impor-
tant inequalities in terms of inclusion in the labour mar-
ket. As a matter of fact, people with a psychical impair-
ment are less likely to enter the labour market, even if
important efforts are deployed to make vocational reha-
bilitation programmes more accessible to them.
All three paradoxes provide insights into the pro-
cesses underlying the gap between a universalistic
approach to activation and its selective outcomes.
Additionally, a fourth paradox should be considered
(even if our quantitative analyses do not allowmeasuring
precisely its impact). It refers to the issue of non-take-up
and the situation of people who, for many different rea-
sons, do not claim welfare benefits they are entitled to
(see, for example, van Oorschot, 1991, 1995). As we have
shown elsewhere (Rosenstein, 2018), activation may re-
inforce the non-take-up of welfare benefits or services
by making people reluctant to endorse the duties and
behavioural requirements that have been strengthened
by active reforms. In-depth biographical interviews car-
ried out with DI claimants reveal the negative impact of
active reforms on their perceived eligibility and on their
beliefs and feelings associated to DI, which have been
shown to be prerequisites to claiming for benefits (Kerr,
1982). More specifically, activation tends to erode peo-
ple’s sense of entitlement (Hobson, 2014) and produces
non-take-up or delayed take-up, which is paradoxical re-
garding the objective of early intervention promoted by
DI reforms. As such, beside the forms of selectivity pre-
sented in Section 4 above, a universalistic approach to
activation may also result in forms of self-selection and
non-take-up.
These findings also apply to other policy fields and
contexts, beyond Switzerland and the case of disabil-
ity policies, and may shed light upon why the universal
ambition of activation policies often results in practices
of selectivity and exclusion. Further research should ex-
amine whether all forms of universalism are equally ex-
posed to such paradoxes. We could for instance differen-
tiate between two ideal-typical versions of universalism.
The first one sets high and precise standards in terms
of eligibility criteria and behavioural requirements and
focuses on individual responsibility and supply-side poli-
cies rather than social responsibility and demand-side
policies. In this case, universalistic approaches to acti-
vation impose high burdens of individuals who have to
adapt to institutional requirements andmay be excluded
altogether from activation programmes if they do not
meet these expectations. We suggest labelling this first
ideal-type “hard universalism.” The second one relies on
less precise and less requiring eligibility or behavioural
criteria, leaving more space to take into account recipi-
ents’ abilities and aspirations and to develop tailor-made
programmes. It advocates a more balanced combination
of individual and social responsibility, and of supply—
and demand-side policies when it comes to including
people in the labour market. This second version could
be more inclusive as it pays more attention to people’s
actual situation and aspirations. We propose calling this
second ideal-type “soft universalism.” Our contention is
that hard universalism may have significant exclusionary
effects for all those who cannot fulfil its requirements,
either due to selectivity by welfare employees assessing
them as unfit for activation or via self-selection (or rather
self-exclusion) due to a perceived inability tomeet the of-
ficial expectations. By contrast, soft universalism, where
requirements may be to a larger extent adjusted accord-
ing to people’s circumstances and aspirations, may lead
to more inclusivity and effective universalism, although
it would not eliminate of course all forms of selectivity.
Actual programmes are situated in-between these ideal-
typical situations. We suggest here that one key explana-
tion of the paradoxes of activation within the Swiss DI
could well lie in its tendency to privilege a hard version
of universalism. Further research would be needed to ex-
plore this hypothesis in more depth, for instance by in-
vestigating the outcomes of programmes that give more
space to soft universalism.
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